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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- Inherent Power of State Supreme
Court to Grant Bail in Habeas Corpus Proceeding. Defendant was
convicted of common law rape, a capital offense, and sentenced to
serve fourteen years in the state penitentiary. Defendant did not ask
for bail in the trial court pending his appeal presumably because Sec.
7-8, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, specifically denied bail to
anyone convicted and sentenced to more than ten years. Defendant
thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
HELD: the legislature may not abridge powers specifically granted
to the Supreme Court by the State Constitution; the Supreme Court
has the inherent power to set bond in any case; under the circum-
stances presented by the defendant, he should be granted bail. State
v. Whitener, Supreme Court of South Carolina, April 3, 1954.
At common law, a person, after conviction and pending appeal,
was not entitled to bail as a matter of right, but the granting or deny-
ing thereof was within the sound discretion of the court. State v.
Satterwhite, 20 S. C. 536 (1884); Newson v. Scott, 151 Ga. 639,
107 S.E. 854 (1921) ; In Re Williams, 54 App. D.C. 65, 294 F. 996
(1924). The court in exercising its sound discretion will not allow
bail to one convicted of a capital offense except under extraordinary
circumstances as the evidence and presumption against guilt ceases
to exist upon his conviction. Vanderford v. State, 126 Ga. 67, 54
S. E. 822 (1906). Constitutional provisions, which give all persons
before conviction the right to bail with certain specified exceptions,
do not confer the right to bail to persons after conviction. Ex Parte
Herndon, 18 Okla. Crim. Rep. 68, 192 P. 820, 19 A. L. R. 804
(1929); Ex Parte Blanche B. Halsey, 124 Ohio St. 318, 178 N. E.
271, 77 A. L. R. 1232 (1931). Thus bail after conviction remains
as a matter for the sound discretion of the court. Butt v. State, 131
Tenn. 415, 175 S.W. 529 (1915). "Upon reason and principle it
would seem that it could not have been in the mind of theconstitu-
tional framers to admit to bail in cases after conviction, except in
the discretion of the trial judge." Ex Parte Blanche B. Halsey,
supra. Legislation, denying bail after conviction, has been upheld
as constitutional and particularly not in derogation of one's consti-
tutional right to bail before conviction. Ex Parte Herndon, supra;
City of Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48 S. D. 378, 204 N.W. 999, 45
A. L. R. 447 (1925). In these same jurisdictions, the constitutional
provisions granting the Supreme Court its powers are practically
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identical with the provisions of the constitution granting the power
of the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction which decided the instant
case. The Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, 1907, Art. VII,
Sec. 2; Constitution of the State of South Dakota, 1889, Art. V, Sec.
3. The Constitution of the State of South Carolina, 1895, Art. 5,
Sec. 4, grants: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue
writs or orders of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and other original and remedial writs".
This has been interpreted to give implied authority to the Supreme
Court to grant any relief for which such writs are an appropriate
remedy. State v. Farris, 51 S. C. 176,28 S.E. 308 (1897). Unlike the
South Carolina Court, the Second Federal Circuit has held that "it
seems to us that the power to admit to bail is not a power inherent
in the court, and that it is not necessary that a court should be pos-
sessed of such power in order that it may perform its functions and
administer the laws". United States ex rel. Carapa v. Curran, 297
Fed. 946, 36 A. L. R. 877 (2d Cir. 1924). Inherent power of the
judiciary has been defined as that which is essential to the existence,
dignity and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a
court. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W. (2d) 977 (1937) ;
In Re Integration Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283,
275 N.W. 265, 14 A. L. R. 151 (1937).
The Supreme Court in the instant case has indirectly declared as
unconstitutional Sec. 7-8, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952,
.insofar as it is applicable to the court of last resort in denying it the
power to grant bail in specified cases. To all inferior courts the
statute is still in effect. All the courts created by the Constitution
of this State appear to have the same inherent power as the courts
at common law. As will be seen by examining the Constitution, the
Court of Common Pleas has the same power to issue writs of habeas
corpus as does the Supreme Court. Yet, the Supreme Court con-
siders legislation denying the power to bail to inferior courts as con-
stitutional while at the same time takes an opposite stand in regard
to legislation affecting itself. It would appear that there is no reason
why legislation regulating bail after conviction should be declared
unconstitutional when such legislation does not interfere with the
constitutional right of bail, nor with the existence, dignity, and func-
tions of the Supreme Court. The power of the Courts to grant bail,
it seems, should be governed by the facts and circumstances of each
case before it; in these facts and circumstances should be included
the law pertaining to bail as is generally laid down by common law
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or modified by statute. The dissenting opinion along with the great
weight of authority seem to have adopted the better rule- that is,
the legislature does have the power to deny bail after conviction.
E. WINDLI, MCCRACKIN.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- Recovery for a Second In-
jury. Employee brings action against employer under Section 7035-
34(p) of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1942, (The Workmen's
Compensation Law) which provides for compensation for loss of a
leg. Before coming into the employ of the defendant, employee had
sustained entire loss of one leg. As result of an accident incurred
while in the employ of defendant, plaintiff had four inches of the
remaining stump removed. The Hearing Commissioner and the full
Industrial Commission disallowed the claim. The Court of Common
Pleas reversed the Commission and ordered an award for permanent
disability for loss of entire leg. On appeal, HELD: Reversed. Com-
pensation must be based solely upon the extent to which the loss or
loss of use existing after the injury exceeds that which existed prior
thereto. Hopper v. Firestone Stores, 222 S. C. 143, 72 S.E. 2d 71
(1952).
Workmen's Compensation Laws were passed for the purpose of
alleviating the economic burden incurred by workers as a result
of injuries, by passing on the responsibility of payment to the em-
ployer and ultimately to the consumer, and were not predicated on
any theory of fault. Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission of the State of California and Juan Palma, 294
U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044 (1934); Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180,
179 N.E. 684, 79 A. L. R. 669 (1932) ; Cokeley et al. v. Robert Lee,
Inc., 197 S. C. 157, 14 S.E. 2d 889 (1941). Of how much of this
burden is he to be relieved when the injury combines with a former
injury or condition to produce the resulting disability? Nearly all
states are in agreement that the employee can recover for the whole
disability when an industrial injury precipitates disability or death
from a latent prior condition, such as heart disease, back weakness,
etc. Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Hadley et al., 70 Ariz. 179, 218 P. 2d 488
(1950); Ferguson v. State Highway Department, 197 S. C. 520, 15
S.E. 2d 775 (1940). When an injury combines with an existing
disability to produce a third resulting disability, the courts are in
conflict, depending on interpretation of the statute, as to the amount
[Vol. 6
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recoverable. One view is that the employee is entitled to compen-
sation for the total effect of the second injury regardless of his pre-
vious condition. Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., 216 N. Y. 712,
111 N.E. 1099 (1915); Knoxville Knitting Mills v. Gaylor, 148
Tenn. 228, 255 S.W. 41, 30 A. L. R. 976 (1923). Many states now
have second-injury funds out of which the employee is paid for his re-
sultant disability, and the employer is held liable for only that part
caused by the single injury. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com-
pensation, sec. 59.30 (1952); 3 Miami Law Quarterly 644 (June,
1949). Other courts interpret their statutes as allowing the claimant
to recover only an amount proportionate to the individual injury re-
gardless of what its disabling effect may be. Bennett v. White Coal
Co., 288 Ky. 827, 157 S.W. 2d 73 (1941); Georgia Insurance Ser-
vice et al. v. Lord, 83 Ga. App. 28, 62 S.E. 2d 402 (1950). In
Schwartz v. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Mills, Inc., 206 S. C. 227, 335
S.E. 2d 517 (1944), South Carolina followed this view in regard to
impairment of vision. The claimant's vision, prior to the injury, was
subnormal due to cataracts. The Court, without considering the
decisions of other jurisdictions, allowed recovery for only ten per
cent of total loss of the eye, when the injury resulted in a loss equal
to ten per cent of normal vision, even though it impaired claimant's
subnormal vision by fifty per cent. Relying heavily on this case and
upon a section of the Workmen's Compensation Law which allowed
compensation "only for the degree of disability which would have
resulted from the later accident if the earlier disability or injury had
not existed," Sec. 7035-36 (33), Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1942, the Supreme Court, in the instant case, interpreted the statute
as requiring that the amount that would have been recoverable for
the previous injury, had it been compensable under the Workmen's
Compensation Law, must be deducted from the award for the dis-
ability.
The statute on its face is equally susceptible of an interpretation
which would allow compensation for the claimant at the same rate
that he would have received had his leg been whole prior to the acci-
dent. In fact, in his opinion in the Hopper Case, Chief Justice Baker
referred to a Tennessee decision which interpreted a very similar
statute in this manner (Knoxville Knitting Mills v. Gaylor, supra.).
The argument most often made in favor of the view that the South
Carolina, Court has adopted is that it prevents the employer from
having to pay for an injury that did not occur in his employ or
from having to pay twice for an injury previously received by the
1954]
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employee. In reality, however, this is not the effect. For example:
an employee loses half his leg and is compensated therefor at the
rate allowed for one half of a total loss. If his injury detracts from
his working ability, when he returns to work his wages will be de-
creased accordingly. If he then loses the other half of his leg and
the court allows him compensation for only half a leg, the compensa-
tion will be based on his salary from which his former loss has al-
ready been deducted, and he will receive less compensation for the
loss of the second half of his leg than he did for the first. His com-
pensation for the total leg will then be less than it would have been
had he lost it all in one accident, yet he will have undergone the ex-
pense and necessary adjustment of two separate injuries. If the
first injury does not detract from his working ability, so far as his
employment is concerned, he is in all respect a normal worker and
there is no reason that his employer should not pay for the total re-
sulting disability the same as though the employee were completely
free of disability before the accident. On the other hand, the doc-
trine followed by the Tennessee Court in the above case would make
it more difficult for handicapped persons to secure employment due
to the increased risk the employer would take in hiring them. Per-
haps the best solution is through legislation, such as the "second
injury funds" adopted in many States, which would assure the em-
ployee of complete compensation for any disabilities incurred and
would prevent the employer from taking an additional risk in hiring
handicapped workers.
ROBeRT M. HoLms.
INSURANCE - Pledge of Life Insurance Policy as Collateral Se-
curity. Proceedings to determine whether named beneficiaries or
creditor bank was entitled to proceeds of insurance policies of the
deceased. The policies were originally "deposited" with the bank
to secure a loan which was subsequently satisfied and remained in
the possession of the bank under a parol pledge agreement to secure
the general line of credit of the deceased. The district court awarded
judgment to the beneficiaries. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. Under
Georgia common law, incorporeal things, including insurance poli-
cies, could not be pledged. Commercial Nat. Bank of Cedartown, Ga.
v. Chapman et al., 206 F. 2d 349 (5th Cir. 1953).
It is generally acknowledged that a matured policy of insurance is
capable of assignment just as other money claims. Jackson v. Tall-
[Vol. 6
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inadge, 246 N. Y. 133, 158 N.E. 48 (1927); Curtis v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co., 90 Cal. 245, 27 P. 211, 25 Am. St. Rep. 114, (1891) ;
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Aston, 123 Va. 327, 96 S.E. 772 (1918).
It is only when the policy is not matured, a contingent right, that
problems arise. Thus, the problem of insurable interest has been
decided in favor of the assignee in most jurisdictions, provided only
that the assignment be bona fide and not for the purpose of evading
the insurable interest requirement. Atkins v. Cotter, 145 Ark. 326, 224
S.W. 624 (1920) ; Smith v. Coleman, 184 Va. 259, 35 S.E. 2d 107,
160 A. L. R. 1376 (1945). It is further held that an insured can
assign a policy of life insurance payable to a third party as benefici-
ary only with the consent of such party or when the power to assign
or to change the beneficiary is expressly reserved to the insured.
Antley v. New York Life Insurance Co., 139 S. C. 23, 137 S.T. 199,
60 A. L. R. 184 (1927) ; Janesville State Bank v. Aetna Life Insur-
ance Co., 200 Minn. 312, 274 N.W. 232, 111 A. L. R. 705 (1937).
Most assignments of life policies are made as pledges to secure debts.
Although such an assignment may be absolute in form it may be
shown that it was conditional and intended to serve only as collateral
security; Nashville Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 123 Tenn. 617,
134 S.W. 311 (1911); Allen v. Home Nat. Bank, 120 Conn. 306,
180 A. 498 (1935); and in such cases the assignee's rights in the
policy are limited to an amount equal to the debt secured, the premi-
ums paid and the interest thereon. Antley v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co., supra; Allen v. Home Nat. Bank, supra. The holder of
the policy as pledgee who has received it as security does not replace
the pledgor as owner but acquires a lien upon the policy. 2 Appleman
Ins. L. & P. 754 (1941); Detroit Life Insurance Co. v. Linsenmier,
241 Mich. 608, 217 N.W. 919 (1928). Life insurance policies, as
choses in action, may not only be pledged to secure an existing in-
debtedness but may be pledged for the purpose of securing future
transactions. Didier v. Patterson, 93 Va. 534, 25 S.E. 661 (1896) ;
Laseter v. Terral, 168 Ark. 435, 270 S.W. 520 (1925). Policy pro-
visions prohibiting any assignment without written notice to the
insurer serve only to relieve the insurer of recognizing the assign-
ment until notice is served. Such provision is for the benefit of the
insurer and should not affect the pledgor-pledgee relationship. Travel-
ers Insurance Co. v. Mayo, 103 Conn. 341, 130 A. 379; Hutsell v. Citi-
zens Nat. Bank, 166 Tenn. 598, 64 S.W. 2d 188 (1933). Delivery
to the pledgee or someone for him is essential to a pledge. In re
Baird, 245 Fed. 504 (D.C, Del. 1917). Many states have held that
1954].
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a parol pledge, accompanied by delivery, of an insurance policy is
enforceable at law. Barron v. Williams, 58 S. C. 280, 36 S.E. 561
(1900); Nashville Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 123 Tenn. 617,
134 S.W. 311 (1911). Possession at the same time of a note execut-
ed by an insured and of a policy belonging to that insured raises a
presumption that the policy is being held as collateral for the note.
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Kansas City Nat. Bank, 121 Mo. A.
479, 97 S.W. 195 (1906).
Early life insurance policies provided only for death benefits and
were properly subjected to controls to protect the rights of benefici-
aries. With the growing usage of insurance as an investment, how-
ever, policies now provide for options of cash surrender value, cash
loans and loans to pay premiums. In this manner the policy can be-
come an asset to the insured as well. The premium-paying beneficiary
can protect himself from loss in any event simply by procuring a
policy without the change-of-beneficiary provision. If the investment
potential of life insurance is to be fully realized, the policy-owner
must be free to transfer any interest in the policy with a minimum
of difficulty. The principal case, in this respect, represents the narrow
view which would force the insured, who owns his own policy, to
resort to a written assignment. There seems little justification for
maintaining such a rule as against a bank-pledgee which has lent
money on the strength of the policy.
WALLAC M. WRIGHT.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE- Reasonableness as a Factor in the
Application of the Sherman Anti-,Trust Act. Action under 15 U. S. C.
Section 1, et seq. (1890) to enjoin the enforcement of respondent's
by-laws prohibiting a member club from granting television or radio
rights to any of its games without written approval of respondent's
Commissioner. HELD: Only the prohibition against the televising
of outside games (beyond a 75 mile radius of the home club) into the
home territories of other teams on days when such other teams are
playing at home is a reasonable, and therefore legal, restraint of trade
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. United States v. National Foot-
ball League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
The English common law initially held any agreement whereby a
person's freedom to work or trade was restricted to be uncondition-
ally contrary to public policy and consequently void. Dyer's Case,
Y. B. 2 Hen. V, f. 5, pl. 26 (1415). This view was later modified
[Vol. 6
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by the leading case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 E. R.
347 (1711), which held that the law presumes all agreements in re-
straint of trade to be illegal, but that such could be rebutted by a
showing that the agreement was reasonable in the light of benefits
conferred on the particular trade and the absence of detriment to
the public. The matter of reasonableness is to be determined from
all of the circumstances as a matter of law. Mitchel v. Reynolds,
supra; Davis v. Mason, 5 Term Rep. 118, 101 E. R. 69 (1793). The
uncertainty of this view was acknowledged by Kenyon, C. J., in
Davis v. Mason, supra, wherein he stated that the agreement was
reasonable, but that he did not know where to draw the line. Re-
straints limited in time and space are not void by virtue of being not
contrary to public policy; in fact, contracts in partial restraint of
trade are beneficial to the public as well as to the immediate parties.
Mumford v. Gething, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 305, 141 E. R. 834 (1859).
Agreements of such a nature are not enforced because of the benefit
to the parties concerned, but rather because of the benefit to the
public at large. Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653, 152 E. R. 967
(1843). Certain restraints are recognized as being necessary securi-
ties for persons engaged in particular trades, Homer v. Ashiford, 3
Bing. 322, 130 E. R. 537 (1825), but an agreement which goes be-
yond the reasonable requirements for protection of such persons is
void. Mallan v. May, supra.
The first instance of the consideration of the English common law
-rule of reason in the enforcement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
supra, by the U. S. Supreme Court, resulted in a five to four de-
cision rejecting its applicability. United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n., 166 U. S. 290 (1897) ; accord, United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n., 171 U. S. 505 (1898). The rule of reason was in-
directly acknowledged in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U. S. 211, 238 (1899), wherein the Court stated that at
common law there was no question of reasonableness open to the
courts in regard to contracts for price fixing, for the tendency of
such agreements is to give the parties the power to set unreasonable
prices. Accord, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S.
392 (1927) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of A4nerica, 148 F. 2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945). All evidence of reasonableness has been specifi-
cally excluded in certain situations in view of the object and purpose
of the combination, its potential power, its tendency towards monopo-
ly and the coercion it could and did practice on rival methods of
competition; these factors are considered sufficient to bring the agree-
ment within the policy of absolute prohibition as set forth in the
19541
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Sherman Act. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 467 (1941). The first positive
adoption by the Court of the common law view was in Standard
Oil Company of Yew Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1910),
wherein it was stated that the Sherman Act took its origin from,
and its ends were the same as, the common law, i. e. the prohibition
of agreements in restraint of trade which are detrimental to the in-
terests of the common weal. It was not the intent of the Sherman
Act to unduly limit its application by precise definition of what agree-
ments were forbidden; but by clearly fixing the boundaries which
could not be transgressed without impunity, it left for the courts to
determine by the light of reason, guided by the principles of law
and the public policy proclaimed by the statute, the legality of each
particular instance of restraint of trade. Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, supra at 63. Only acts, contracts or agree-
ments which operate to the prejudice of the public interest by unduly
restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade,
or which because of their inherent nature and effect or because of
their evident purpose, fall within the condemnation of Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Ainerican Tobacco Co.,
221 U. S. 142, 179 (1910). The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps there-
by promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago
v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1917) ; accord, Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 360 (1933). The size.
of a corporation is a pertinent factor to be considered in adjudging
the reasonableness of its acts in restraint of trade, but such factor
must be weighed against the size of the industry to which the cor-
poration belongs and the needs for expansion in such industry. United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 533 (1948). The end
sought in enacting the Sherman Act was the prevention of restraints
to free competition in business and commerce which tend to restrict
production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detri-
ment of the purchasers or consumers of goods and services; all of
which has come to be regarded as a special form of public injury.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. William Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 493 (1940).
The history of the enforcement of the Sherman Act, clearly indi-
cates that since 1910 the courts have acknowledged that the reason-
ableness of the restraint of, trade is a factor to be considered in de-
termining the legality of same. Anti-trust decisions of the Court
prior to the announcement of the rule of reason are of little value
[Vol, 6
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today. Hodges, Restraintsof Trade and Unfair Competition, 6 SCLQ
124, 126 (1953). There'is, and there will continue to be, consider-
able dispute as to whether, in a particular decision, the Court was
correct in its determination of reasonableness. The dissent of Mr.
Justice Douglas, in which he was joined by three other members
of the Court, in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra at 536,
is evidence of the fact that what appears to certain members of the
Court as a reasonable or unreasonable restraint of trade is more de-
pendent on such members' social and economic philosophy than it is
%on pure legal precedent and logic. The Court's interpretation of
reasonableness changes with the times and thereby reflects the cur-
rent attitude of the populace and the Court towards the activities
of "big business". Both the object and the means of the law are
derived from economic and political ideas as much as, or perhaps
more than, from legal ones. Edwards, The Place of Economics in the
Course on Trade Regulations, 1 J. Legal Ed. 1, 4 (1948). The
general intent of the Sherman Act is not to limit the growth of
.business, but rather to .prevent an aggressive minority from destroy-
ing the free market which makes that growth possible. Arnold, The
Sherman Act on Trial, Atlantic Monthly, July 1953, p. 38. In most
instances it can not be absolutely stated that a particular form of
restraint of trade is or is not reasonable; the closest approximation
of a correct prediction of the Court's judgment in a given situation
will be reached by an examination of the economic and social attitudes
of the members of the Court.
ELDoN E. WoLV4, JR.
WILLS- Implied Revocation by Divorce. Plaintiff, the execu-
tor of the estate of deceased, instituted action in the Court of Probate
for a declaratory judgment to define the rights of the widow of the
deceased under a will executed prior to the divorce. The Court of
Probate held -that the will had been revoked by implication as to the
widow and this judgment was reversed in the intermediate court.
On appeal, HELD: Reversed. Where husband during marriage
executed will devising half his property to his wife, and thereafter
wife obtained divorce decree confirming fair and equitable property
division, divorce impliedly revoked provision in will for benefit of
wife. Younker v. Johnson -........-Ohio St -...., 116 N.E. 2d 715
,(1954).
In the absence of a statute to the contrary or special circumstances
making divorce operate as a revocation of a previously executed will,
1954]
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the mere divorce of a testator does not ordinarily revoke the will.
Pacetti v. Rowlinski, 169 Ga. 602, 150 S.E. 910 (1929); Charlton
v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298, 22 Am. St. Rep. 307 (1875); In re
Brown's Estate, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N.W. 260, 14 Prob. Rep. Ann.
263 (1908). The doctrine of implied revocation has not been fol-
lowed in many jurisdictions mainly because the testator's, not having
revoked his will, that act being so easily done, creates a strong pro-
bability that he did not intend to do so. Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn.
492, 40 Am. Rep. 187 (1881) ; In re Arnold's Estate, 60 Nev. 376,
110 P. 2d 204 (1941). Where the circumstances and conditions
existing at the time of a divorce justify the implied presumption of
revocation of the husband's will in favor of his wife, evidence as to
whether or not he subsequently intended to allow the will to remain
is immaterial. In re McGraw's Estate, 233 Mich. 440, 207 N.W. 10,
42 A. L. R. 1283 (1926); former appeal in 288 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.
686, 37 A. L. R. 308 (1924). A divorce between husband and wife,
with a judgment for permanent alimony, followed by an agreement
of settlement, which agreement was sufficient to settle all the property
rights of the parties, is such "a change of circumstances" affecting
the husband as to work, by implication, a revocation of his previously
executed will. In re Bartlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681, 189 N.W. 390,
190 N.W. 869, 25 A. L. R. 39 (1922). It has been held that a will
executed before marriage, that made no reference to the marriage,
and ostensibly was not executed in contemplation of marriage is not
revoked by a subsequent marriage and divorce with property settle-
ment. Codner v. Caldwell, 156 Ohio St. 197, 101 N.E. 2d 910 (1951).
Some state statutes abolish the implied revocation doctrine altogether,
Rhode Island, R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 566, Sec. 18, while others
expressly provide for revocation by divorce. North Carolina, N. C.
Code (1953) Sec. 31-5.4; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp.
1938) Sec. 8992-40; Pennsylvania, P. L. 89, 20 P. S. Sec. 180.7 (2)
(Wills Act of 1947). Where a statute prescribes certain methods
for revocation of wills and contains no exception permitting implied
revocation, the divorce may be held not to revoke the prior will, even
though the statute provides that other subsequent events, such as
marriage or birth of a child, shall revoke a prior will, the court tak-
ing the position that the statutory methods of revocation are exclu-
sive. Jones' Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 60 A. 915, 69 L. R. A. 940, 107 Am.
St. Rep. 581, 3 Ann. Cas. 221 (1905). It is now generally held,
no statute being involved, that where the property rights of the
parties to a divorce action have been settled in contemplation or anti-
cipation of a divorce, such a settlement followed by a divorce im-
[Vol. 6
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pliedly revokes a prior will of one spouse in favor of the other. Lans-
ing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N. W. 699, 35 Am. St. Rep. 545
(1893) ; Donaldson v. Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N.W. 219, 20 L. R.
A. (NS) 1073, 130 Am. St. Rep. 621, 16 Ann. Cas. 541 (1909);
In re Bartlett's Estate, supra.
The principal case reaches a sound conclusion by following the
general rule that a divorce and property settlement imply a revoca-
tion of a prior will. The question of implied revocation of a prior
will by divorce has not been decided by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, but as we have a statute covering methods of revoking a
will, divorce not being mentioned, South Carolina would probably
follow the theory that the statutory methods are exclusive. The only
two methods of revoking a will set forth in our statute are those
which were followed at common law: subsequent marriage and
death leaving his widow, or leaving issue of such marriage. Divorce,
therefore, would likely not work as an implied revocation of a will
in South Carolina and the only way to alter this would be by legisla-
tive enactment. Although there are many jurisdictions which do not
recognize the implied revocation theory, it seems to be more equitable
to hold that a divorce accompanied with a property settlement is
such a "change of circumstances" of testator as would work to im-
pliedly revoke a prior will.
GwoRGZ L. DIAL.
TORTS - The Right to Privacy. Plaintiff had installed in her
home a residential telephone which was unmetered and a business
telephone which was metered. Defendant had specifically told plain-
tiff that the residential telephone could not be used for business pur-
poses according to state regulations. Plaintiff disregarded this notice
and defendant becoming suspicious monitored said telephone. De-
fendant then informed plaintiff of the excessive business calls being
made and received on said telephone after monitoring in a closed
room for a short time, making no publication of the findings other
than to plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff claims to have suffered mental
anguish alleging an invasion of her right to privacy, and asking
damages. Lower court held there was no invasion where defendant
had reasonable grounds for believing there was misuse and had
monitored the said telephone to confirm same. On appeal, HELD:
Affirmed. Plaintiff's shameful conduct precluded any recovery of
damages. The defendant under state regulations had a duty and
right to investigate suspicious misuse in its own and public interest.
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Schmukler v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 116 N. E. 2d 819 (Ohio,
1953).
The right to privacy as an independent, legal and enforceable
right is a development of the last 50 years and still is in its infancy.
It was given its initial impetus in 1890 in an article by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis - "And now the right to life has
come to mean the right to enjoy life -the right to be let alone."
The Rig/it to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Prior to that
time in England and America this right was given effect under
property rights, implied contract, breach of confidence, libel, assault,
etc. Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. & 0. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171
(1849); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 N. Y. Super. Ct. 379 (1855). The
majority of our courts have since affirmed the right to privacy in-
dependent of property rights, etc., the invasion of which gives rise
to a cause of action. Pavesich v'. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) ; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App, 285,
297 P. 91 (1931); Hinish v. Meier and Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113
P. 2d 438 (1941); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927) ; Holloman v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 192 S. C. 454, 7 S.E.
2d 169 (dicta, 1940). Some courts have held that that right is pre-
dicated upon the constitutional guarantees of life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291
(1942) ; Pavesich v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra; Melvin
v. Reid, supra. These guarantees secure the right to live in seclusion
or in public gaze as one chooses so long as one does not interfere
with rights of others. It has been said by the Supreme Court that
the Federal Constitution does not confer any right of privacy that
is beyond the power of states to restrict. Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 42 S. Ct. 516 (1922). Natural law has also
been suggested as basis of the right. Pavesich v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra; McGovern v. Riper, et al., 137 N. J. Eq.
24, 43 A. 2d 514 (1945). However, in absence of a statute it has
been held not to exist as an independent and legal right. Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
Thereafter, in 1903 New York enacted a statute which permits re-
covery only where there is the unauthorized use of a person's name
or photo for advertising or trade purposes. Utah and Virginia have
since followed suit. Only one jurisdiction does not recognize the
existence of the right of privacy. Henry v. C]herry and Webb, 30
,R. I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909). Where the common law right of privacy
is recognized it is also apparent that there are limitations. Pavesich
v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra; Flake v. Greensboro
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News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) ; McGovern v. Riper,
.supra; Barber v. Time, Inc., supra. The right does not prohibit any
publication of matter which 'is of ptiblic or general interest. Jones v.
Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W. 2d 972 (1929) ; Sidis v. F-R
Pub. Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (1940). The right to privacy like other
Tights may be waived. Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins.
Co., supra. Non-publication of result of the.invasion of privacy wil
not prevent an action therefor. McDaniel v. Atlantic Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 60 Ga. '92, 2 S.E. 2d 810 (1939); Rhodes v. Graham,
238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W. 2d 46 (1931). One whose right is unlawfully
invaded may recover substantial damages although only suffering
mental anguish. Rhodes v. Graham, supra; Brents v. Morgan, supra;
Hinish v. Meier and Prank Co., supra.; Pavesich v. New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co., supra. However, damages may be mitigated and re-
covery denied by plaintiff's conduct. McDaniel v. Atlantic Coca-Cola
Bottling Company, supra.
The result obtained by the 'Ohio court is obviously sound. While
the courts will recognize the right to privacy and grant damages by
an unlawful invasion of that right, the individual's conduct must not
negate his right to have .his privacy kept inviolate. The needs and
rights of society cannot be forgotten even when society has become
complex and there is a greater need than heretofore to protect an
individual's right to privacy. Nqo one can claim an absolute right
to be able to abuse it. Undoubtedly the courts by statute or at com-
mon law will continue to protect that right and once an individual
has suffered mental anguish through no fraud, damages will be
awarded.
FRIEDA SCHAVMER.
INJUNCTION - Should "Pirating" of News Be Enjoined by News
Association Which Supplied the News or by the Affected Newspap-
er? Plaintiffs, publishers of the only daily newspaper in a town,
seek to enjoin defendants, owners and operators of the only radio
station in the same town, from continuing to broadcast news from
plaintiff's newspaper. Plaintiff receives this news by virtue of its
membership in Associated Press, a non-profit membership corpora-
tion, whose expenses are equitably divided among its member news-
papers. Defendant objected to interrogatories and moved for dis-
missal on several grounds, one of them being that the right asserted
is unknown to the law. HELD: Plaintiff is entitled to relief if
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he can show injury. Veatch v. Wagner, 109 F. Supp. 537 (D. Alas-
ka 1953).
An injunction is a means through which a court of equity acts to
prevent future injuries to some right belonging to the complainant.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, 133 F. 2d 955 (7th Cir. 1943); Zander v. Phillips,
213 F. 29 (5th Cir. 1914) ; Hamilton v. Davis, 217 S.W. 431 (Texas
1919). But before an injunction will issue it must appear that some
substantial and positive injury will occur in its absence. Lowe v.
Copeland, 125 Cal. App. 315, 13 P. 2d 522 (1932); Fralinger v.
Cooke, 108 Md. 682, 71 Atl. 529 (1908). Unfair competition with
a legitimate business is a type of injury which may be enjoined.
Standard Oil Co. of Maine v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 45
F. 2d 309 (1st Cir. 1930); Miles Laboratories v. Seignious, 30 F.
Supp. 549 (E.D. S.C. 1939). In a landmark case the United States
Supreme Court affirmed an injunction which enjoined one news
agency (INS) from using AP bulletins as its own. The decision was
based on the proposition that such "pirating" was unfair competi-
tion between rival news agencies. International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918). The doctrine of unfair
competition was again applied when Associated Press sought to en-
join a radio station which was pirating news from an AP member
newspaper. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F. 2d 575 (9th Cir.
1935). Upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed
this case and dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, say-
ing, by way of dictum, that since AP was a non-profit membership
corporation which divided its expenses equitably among its members,
it was unable to suffer any financial injury. KVOS v. Associated
Press, 299 U. S. 269, 279 (1936). However, membership corpora-
tions have been allowed to maintain suit for injunction in a repre-
sentative capacity on behalf of their respective members. Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. 2d 774 (3rd Cir.
1939) ; International News Service v. Associated Press, supra. But
even where a potential injury can be shown, sometimes one of the
requirements for federal jurisdiction is that the amount in contro-
versy exceed the sum or value of $3,000. 62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28
U.S.C.A. Sec. 1331, 1332 (Supp. 1953). These sections have been
interpreted to mean that where injunction is sought, the test of the
jurisdictional amount is the value of the right that has been invaded
or threatened, rather than the extent of the monetary loss or damage
that has been suffered or is threatened. Walsh v. Boston & Maine
Ry. Co., 87 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1950); Harris v. Brown, 6 F.
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2d 922 (W.D. Ky. 1925). Several persons may join as plaintiffs
if the subject matter of their complaints relates to the same trans-
actions and the questions are common to all the parties. FED. R.
CIV. P. 20(a); Sampson v. Thomas, 76 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Mich.
1948). And it is well-settled that where several persons are joined
as plaintiffs in a suit for injunction and have an interest which is
common and undivided the amount of their joint claim will be the
test of the .jurisdictional amount. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66
(1939) ; Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U. S. 594 (1916).
Since plaintiff newspaper and defendant radio station are direct
competitors for advertising and plaintiff's success depends to a great
extent on the novelty and freshness of the news in his paper, plain-
tiff should have the right to enjoin the radio station from taking the
news free of charge and broadcasting it to plaintiff's potential sub-
scribers. Associated Press should have the right to enjoin the de-
fendant, who has been taking news which was gathered at the
expense of Associated Press members and using it in competition
with plaintiff, who pays part of the cost of gathering this news.
This competition could result in plaintiff's business failure, which
would thereby increase the costs to all other AP members. However,
an action brought by Associated Press in its own name could result
in the court's following the dictum mentioned in KVOS v. Asso-
ciated Press, supra, and dismissing the complaint. Apparently, the
safest action would be one brought by Associated Press in be-
half of its injured members or by the newspaper or newspapers
directly involved, as was done in the instant case. If there were
several parties plaintiff and it was desired that suit be brought in
the federal courts, their claims could be aggregated in order to ob-
tain the jurisdictional amount.
WAITZR A. IZISR.
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - Non-recognition of Capital
Gains and Losses -Exchanges of Property of "Like Kind". Action
by taxpayer to recover overpayments of taxes. Taxpayer exchanged
certain oil, gas, and mineral interests for overriding oil royalties from
other property. The latter were to continue until Taxpayer had re-
ceived $43,000. Because the royalty payments were of a definite
duration, the District Court held the exchange not to be one of proper-
ty of "like kind" under Int. Rev. Code, Sec. 112 (b) (1), and the
gain therefrom was not entitled to non-recognition. On appeal,
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HELD: Reversed. An exchange of mineral interests for mineral
interests does not become an exchange of property of unlike kind
merely because one was of indefinite, the other of definite duration.
F7lening et al. v. Campbell, 205 F. 2d.549, -...... A. F. T. R- .. , .......
'U.S.T.C ......... , (5th Cir. 1953).
Int. Rev. Code, Sec. 112 (b) (1) provides for the non-recognition
of gains and losses in certain cases where property is exchanged for
other property of "like kind" U. S. Tres. JReg. 118, Sec. 39.112 (b)
(1) (1953), provides that "like kind" has reference to the nature or
character of the property and not its grade or quality. The purpose
and policy is that gain or loss should not be recognized in transactions
where the taxpayer may have realized a gain or loss in theory but
where in fact his economic situation is unchanged. Century Electric
Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F. 2d 155, 41 A.F.T.R. 210, 51-2 U.S.T.C.
Par. 9482, (8th Cir. 1951). In the economic sense there has been a
mere change in the form of ownership; substance, not form, should
control in determining whether gain or loss has been realized or sus-
tained. Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 33, 33
A.F.T.R. 610,45-1 U.S.T.C. Par. 9234, (6th Cir. 1945). In the prin-
cipal case, the court relied on the decision of Commissioner v. Crich-
ton, 122 F. 2d 181, 27 A.F.T.R. 824, 41-2 U.S.T.C. Par. 9638, .(5th
Cir. 1941), which affirmed a decision by the Board of Tax Appeals.
There, an exchange of mineral interest for improved city property was
held to be an exchange of property of "like kind". Yet in the lower
court opinion of that case, Midfield Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 42
B.T.A. 490 (1941), was cited as authority to the effect that an ex-
change of an overriding royalty for an oil payment limited in amount
would not be an exchange of property of "like kind". The Midfield Oil
Co. case, supra, was not discussed in the opinion rendered by the 5th
Circuit in Commissioner v. Crichton, supra, nor in the principal case.
In a case subsequent to Commissioner v. Crichton, supra, it was
held that a transfer of a leasehold in oil lands for a stated amount
!f oil to be recovered from other lands or leases of the other party
to the transaction was mot -an exchange of like property. Bandini
lPetroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 1951 (P.-H.) T. C. Memo. Dec.
Par. 51, 310, 10 T. C. 1VL 999 (1951). An exchange of a producing
oil lease 'extending until the exhaustion of the deposit, for the fee
interest in an improved ranch to be held for productive use was ruled
-to constitute an exchange of property of a "like kind". . T. 4093,
1952-2 Cure. Bull. 131 (1952). The distinction made 'by the statute
is the broad one between classes and characters of properties; the
statute was not intended to draw any distinction between parcels of
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real property, however dissimilar they may be in location, in attri-
butes and in capacities for profitable uses. Commissioner v. Crichton,
supra.
The instant case in following the ruling of Commissioner v.
Crichton, supra, extended the scope of what constitutes an exchange
of property of "like kind". Until this case, an exchange of a mineral
interest of an indefinite duration for a mineral interest of a definite
duration was not considered an exchange of property of "like kind".
(Bandini and Midfield cases, supra.) Yet neither of these cases were
discussed in the principal case. Apparently, they were not brought
to the court's attention. Since the Bandini and Midfield cases were
not expressly disapproved, the law in this area is still not clear. This
latest case marks a trend toward a broad interpretation of what con-
stitutes an exchange of property of "like kind" and not upon the nar-
row interpretation of those words as given by the cases preceding
the principal case. Whichever interpretation the courts follow in the.
future will be controlled by their interpretation of what constitutes
"like kind", which words have yet to be dearly defined by the courts.
AVIN A. COLEMAN, JR.
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